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Abstract—Almost every 2016 flagship mobile phone, whether
Android or iOS-based, is set to come with an integrated fin-
gerprint reader. The convenience benefits of fingerprint readers
are clear to users, but is the underlying technology really ready
for widespread adoption? This article explores some of the
background of the challenge of secure user authentication on
mobile devices, as well as recent weaknesses identified in the
handling of fingerprints on many consumer devices. It also
considers legislatory and social implications of the widespread
adoption of fingerprint authentication. Finally, it attempts to look
forward to some resulting problems we may encounter in the
future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fingerprint readers are, without doubt, one of the must-
have features on almost every smartphone being launched in
2016. The Samsung Galaxy range of flagship devices have
featured a fingerprint reader since the Note 4 and S5. Sony’s
latest Z5 range include a fingerprint reader on each device.
Indeed, even newer entrants to the market such as OnePlus
are including a fingerprint reader on their handsets.
Smartphone fingerprint readers are used typically to imple-
ment biometric authentication. Biometric authentication is, as
the name suggests, a means of authenticating a user based on
making measurements of one or more physical characteristics
— in this case their fingerprint.
Fingerprint authentication on computers is not a new
concept, having previously been seen on Thinkpads and other
enterprise laptops, and even on some high-end Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs). A more detailed history of the use of
biometrics and fingerprints was given by Corcoran in 2013 [1].
As fingerprint readers have become increasingly common-
place in smartphones, particularly following the introduction
of TouchID on the iPhone 5s, there has now been time for
the dust to settle on some implementations, and for security
researchers to investigate their inner workings.
II. USER ATTITUDES AND THE DEMAND FOR
CONVENIENCE
The premise behind fingerprint authentication on mobile
devices is typically as a replacement for the password or
PIN. Good passwords require users to follow a multitude
of rules, ensuring the length, complexity and uniqueness of
every password they use. Remembering unique passwords for
an ever-increasing number of services places a significant
demand upon users, and leads to more easily guessable, or re-
used passwords. Users now carry out 50% of their password
entry operations on smartphones, where special characters are
difficult to type, and long passwords are inconvenient [2].
A key selling point of biometric authentication is that it
allows users to move away from passwords, both for use in
authenticating to third parties, and for unlocking their own
physical device. This eliminates the requirement to enter pass-
words, and avoids the inconvenience of forgetting passwords.
There is clear indication from previous studies that users
are aware of, and willing to use, biometrics — in their 2005
survey, Clarke and Furnell found that 83% of surveyed mobile
phone users would be willing to use biometric authentica-
tion [3]. Indeed, of those aware of the existence of fingerprint
authentication, 99% were happy to use it. This is in clear
contrast with iris recognition, where only 70% of those who
were aware of it were happy to use it.
In contrast, an earlier survey from 2000 [4], which focused
more generally on authentication, rather than specifically on
mobile phone authentication, found 67% of surveyed users
were willing to use fingerprint authentication. While this
would indicate that either user attitudes towards fingerprint
authentication have changed with time, or that users consider
mobile authentication a special case, a 2007 study on the
uses of authentication technologies [5] found that only around
40% of users surveyed agreed biometrics were useful when
accessing a computer, in contrast with 66.1% when considering
financial transactions.
It is worth noting that these surveys were carried out prior
to the recent widespread adoption of smartphones. Nonethe-
less, it is clear that users are willing to use fingerprint au-
thentication, and that the increased portability of smartphones,
combined with the large quantities of personal data stored
within, is potentially a driver for the uptake of the technology.
Harbach et al. showed that the perceived inconvenience of a
secure lockscreen on a smartphone was a factor in around one
third of people not enabling one, and with an average of 48
unlocks per day, there is a clear argument for convenience of
unlocking frequently used devices like smartphones [6].
A. Authentication and Identification
Fingerprints, and biometrics in general, present users with
a simple alternative to PINs or passwords, to which they are
accustomed. We believe fingerprint authentication is viewed
more favourably than alternatives, due in part to the user per-
ception that biometrics are the most secure form of authentica-
tion [5]. In particular, we believe that users feel reassured that
fingerprints are secure in part due to their relative uniqueness,
and their use in criminal justice. This does raise an important
distinction though when considering the use of fingerprints —
the needs of an identification system are somewhat different
to those from an authentication system.
In a biometric identification system, the goal is to reliably
ascertain who an individual is, based upon a comparison of
measurements taken from a sample, which are then matched
against previous measurements. For this to work correctly, each
individual in a population should be uniquely defined, and
should be recognisable in future against a previous measure-
ment. Therefore, there is considerable focus on the uniqueness
of the characteristics. For example, in a criminal investigation,
the aim of forensic fingerprint analysis is to recover the
fingerprints of individuals who may have been present at a
crime scene. Biometric identification is then carried out to
ascertain if this recovered fingerprint matches that recovered
from any other crime scenes, or from individuals known to
have previously committed crimes.
In contrast, a biometric authentication system is designed
to allow an individual asserting their identity to prove this
assertion, based upon their ability to provide biometric mea-
surements in keeping with previously enrolled values. In the
authentication scenario, a rapid result and a low false-positive
rate are desirable. One consideration is that a strong authen-
tication process, per the definition from the European Central
Bank, is required to be non-reusable and non-replicable, to
prevent re-use of a previously valid authentication session
which may have been observed. There is however an exception
made for authentication based on biometric factors, since it
is inherently based on static measurements of a person. The
distinction between identification and authentication is also
discussed in [1].
III. LIMITATIONS OF FINGERPRINTS IN AUTHENTICATION
A. Static and Unchangeable
The fundamental limitation of fingerprint-based authenti-
cation is that our fingerprints are the ones we were born with,
and the ones we keep for life. They are, by virtue of being
part of us, unchangeable. This is an advantage in one sense,
as a user cannot ‘forget’ their fingerprints in the same way
an infrequently used password can be forgotten over time. For
many users, the convenience of not forgetting passwords is a
significant draw of fingerprint authentication.
B. Irrevocable Identifiers
By virtue of being static in nature, there is no effective
means of revocation. If your fingerprints are compromised by
some means, there is no way you can prevent the compromised
copies from being re-used in future. This is a limitation
of the process of fingerprint authentication, since ultimately
the verifier is expecting to see the same fingerprint on each
occasion. Breaches of fingerprint data are now no longer a
hypothetical situation, given the recent theft of 5.6 million US
federal government employees’ fingerprints from the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) [7].
C. Easily Observed and Captured
Fingerprints are also easily captured without the subject
being aware, both with and without physical contact. As
highlighted in 2013 following the highly publicised “breaking”
of Apple’s new Touch ID feature, a latent fingerprint was
captured using a high-resolution photograph of the glass touch-
screen of an iPhone. It was then used to create a mould that
could form an artificial fingerprint, capable of unlocking the
phone [8]. While a relatively in-depth process, this highlights
one fundamental risk of relying on fingerprint authentication
on smartphones — they are held and touched by the user in
daily operation, and their large glass surfaces act as a magnet
for the user’s fingerprints.
Additionally, it was recently shown that fingerprints can
also be captured without physical contact. A series of high
resolution photos, including one from a press release, were
used to recreate the fingerprints of the German defence min-
ister [9]. Indeed, this is not the first occasion in which a
German politician’s fingerprints have been publicised; in 2008,
an index fingerprint was obtained and reproduced from a water
glass used by the German interior minister during an event
at a University, resulting in over 4000 copies being made
onto plastic foil capable of being used on various fingerprint
readers [10].
D. They Can’t be Turned Off
Another property of fingerprints is that they are static, and
cannot easily be ‘turned off’. As you go about your life, you
are leaving a trail of fingerprints around. With the rise of
fingerprint authentication, this could be considered tantamount
to leaving a trail of sticky notes containing your username and
password to every account you have, every time you touch
something.
If a password is compromised or known by someone else, it
is relatively straightforward to change it, therefore revoking it,
with the biggest inconvenience merely having to memorise a
new password. Since they remain constant at all times, this
isn’t possible with fingerprints. Our inability to effectively
control where our fingerprints are left behind is a significant
concern. You can be careful to only type your bank password in
the privacy of your own home, on a system with no keyloggers,
with the curtains closed to prevent onlookers, but if you use
a fingerprint to authenticate with your bank (either directly or
indirectly), you cannot avoid leaving those fingerprints around.
There is no concept of security level with fingerprints in the
same way that one can use a single low-security “throw-away”
password for uninteresting accounts which don’t contain any
personal data of value.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF FINGERPRINT SENSING
Smartphone fingerprint sensors have been subject to a
variety of high-profile attacks, where fake fingerprints made
from a variety of materials designed to have properties similar
to human skin have been accepted as valid fingerprints. Indeed,
these techniques are not outwith the practical reach of private
individuals [8].
More fundamentally, a fingerprint sensor within a computer
system is typically designed to convey a measurement of
an individual’s raw fingerprint to another component of said
computer system, responsible for either deriving a crypto-
graphic key, or unlocking an existing cryptographic key held
securely on the device [1]. Therefore, by identifying the input
format expected by the key storage or computation module,
it is possible to present a falsified (or previously-captured)
fingerprint reading “on the wire”, thus bypassing the need to
handle the creation of a fake physical fingerprint.
V. LEGISLATORY CONCERNS
A. Fingerprinting in Criminal Process
Within most countries in the world, there is a presumption
of innocence for those accused of crimes, until they are con-
victed at a trial in a court of law. Until that point, they remain
innocent and not having been convicted of any wrongdoing.
In many jurisdictions, those who are under arrest, and have
not been charged with, or convicted of, an offence, may be
required to give fingerprints, which can be held on a database,
for the purpose of identifying any linked crimes an individual
may be responsible for [11].
This process, by its definition, involves the capturing of
a record of an individual’s fingerprints. Since fingerprints are
static and irrevocable, this individual’s fingerprints are now
potentially on file indefinitely. If fingerprints are used as a
secure means of authentication, this is equivalent to being
required to hand over a full list of all your past, present, and
future passwords, simply as a part of the investigatory process.
While there may be legal procedures through which indi-
viduals can appeal to have their records removed if they were
not convicted of an offence, it will never be possible for that
individual to be sure that their fingerprints no longer reside on
a database somewhere. The same applies to those travelling to
a country which stores fingerprint records of those entering
as a matter of routine, such as the USA under the OBIM
program (formerly US-VISIT) [12]. Large databases are not
impenetrable to unauthorised access either, as was shown in
the OPM breach mentioned above.
Fingerprints may also be handled differently from a legal
perspective than something which is known to a person, such
as a password or PIN. In the US state of Virginia, a judge
found that requiring the disclosure of a password or PIN
would be in breach of the 5th Amendment, but that requiring a
person suspected of committing a crime to use their fingerprint
to unlock a device was constitutional [13]. It highlights an
interesting situation on some devices, such as the iPhone,
where a fingerprint can only be used within 48 hours of the
last successful fingerprint login, after which the PIN must be
used.
VI. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATIONS
A. Smartphone Implementation
Today’s consumer devices featuring fingerprint authentica-
tion technology typically make use of the ARM TrustZone
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which allows for iso-
lated secure world code to be executed on the regular CPU,
separate from untrusted user code, such as that of a mobile
device’s operating system.
Recent research by Zhang et al. has nonetheless highlighted
the problem of poor implementational security of fingerprint
readers on many mobile devices. In their paper, a number of
security issues with implementations of fingerprint sensors in
mainstream phones were identified [14]. In the most extreme
case of the HTC One MAX, the user’s enrolled fingerprint
was stored in a world-readable file. This meant that any
unprivileged application running on the phone could read the
file containing a user’s fingerprint, without the user being
aware.
While the established best practice for implementation of
fingerprint readers involves the use of the ARM TrustZone
to hold, validate and handle all fingerprint data, Zhang et
al. highlighted that even with this in place, there have been
exploits against TrustZone, and the fingerprint reader device is
often exposed to the regular, non-TrustZone operating system
of the mobile phone. This allows the fingerprint reader to be
accessed by software running on the phone, provided it is able
to elevate its privileges sufficiently to do so.
In addition, there have been numerous publicly documented
exploits of TrustZone technology [15], [16], [17]. All of
these allowed for arbitrary code execution within the secure
environment, and the latter specifically gives a proof of concept
to show how the user’s raw fingerprint can be captured and
retrieved from the reader, despite only code running in the
TrustZone being able to read from the fingerprint reader on
the device in question.
B. Reader Trust
Another, more general consideration with today’s imple-
mentation of fingerprint authentication is that of trust of
the capture device. Since, by definition, fingerprint data is
constant, it is necessary for the reader or capture device to
be trustworthy, and not store or transmit it for use or storage
by unauthorised parties. This raises the questions of who is
authorised to receive the data, how the biometric data may
be used, and the manner in which it may be stored and
processed. Specifically when a device holds biometric data
(such as a smartphone), a question arises over if the company
who manufactures the smartphone has, or should have, any
right (or ability) to access that data. In the case of Android
devices, for example, there is also the question of whether or
not Google (the developer of the core operating system) has
the ability or right to access the data.
A rise in the use of fingerprint authentication on smart-
phones would also likely fuel a rise in the use of fingerprint
authentication in other areas. For example, Poland has installed
bank ATMs featuring fingerprint authentication since 2010,
where a fingerprint is used in conjunction with a PIN to
withdraw cash [18]. Significantly, this requires users to provide
their fingerprints to an unverifiable device operated by a third
party. Fake (or real, with unauthorised modifications) ATMs
have been a popular way for criminals to “skim” cards and
obtain PINs via fake keypads and card readers.
If users become comfortable with providing their finger-
print to equipment requesting it, without being familiar with
it (to identify signs of tampering or illegitimacy), they may
find their fingerprint data is stolen by criminals. While the
same is completely true of bank card numbers and PINs as
used presently at ATMs, there is little long-term impact of
such details being compromised; the bank freezes the account
and reverses the transactions, and issues a new card to the
account holder, who sets a new PIN. In the case of biometric
authentication, it is not possible to change or revoke the
biometric.
C. Other Uses
Biometric data is potentially of huge value to advertisers
and other businesses, as it allows for theoretically globally
unique identification of users, simply based upon their use of
a product or service. If fingerprint readers become a common
feature of consumer electronic devices such as smartphones,
undoubtedly the question over rights to use such data will
emerge and need answered.
Whether it is legal, ethical or acceptable for fingerprint
data to be used to pervasively track a user is a question
which should be answered before such technology becomes
widespread, otherwise we may find ourselves in a situation
like we face with internet-based services, where users have
relatively limited technical controls and restrictions over the
use and sharing of their personal data, and websites carry out
widespread tracking of user activity and actions across the
wider internet.
The ability for an advertiser to tell with certainty that
the current visitor to a website, or user of an application,
is the same one as in a previous browsing session, would
be of incredible value — this would persist across devices
and browsing sessions. It would also be effective against
attempts to prevent such tracking, such as a user clearing their
cookies. While the suggestion not to provide fingerprints to
such websites may well be the obvious one, ensuring this is
enforced with technical (rather than legislatory) measures is
essential. With current fingerprint reader implementations gen-
erally “black box” systems, not open to scrutiny by researchers
or experts, this is difficult to achieve.
D. Action Verification
In contrast to a PIN or password, where a user is prompted
to enter a particular one for a given service or action, fin-
gerprints remain constant between services. This means that
the contextual information as to the action being carried out
following fingerprint verification is critical. Since the same
fingerprint may be used to unlock a device, as well as authorise
a high-value bank transfer, it is important to ensure users have
a reliable and trustworthy way to understand the operation they
are approving via their fingerprint.
Entering a PIN requires a user to understand the action they
are authorising — presuming a user follows good practice and
doesn’t have the same PIN on all of their bank cards, they
can easily detect that they are carrying out a transaction on
the wrong card due to the PIN being rejected. Likewise, while
not fool-proof against malicious attack [19], the screen on an
EMV chip-and-PIN payment terminal confirms the value of a
transaction being carried out, or the recipient and value of a
transfer. On a smartphone featuring fingerprint authentication,
simply providing a fingerprint is sufficient to carry out a variety
of operations. These can extend from merely unlocking the
device, to logging into an app or website, to initiating a bank
transfer. Indeed, smartphone apps from major banks now allow
for the use of fingerprints to authenticate transactions [20].
VII. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
A. Avoiding the Reader
With the rise in smartphone fingerprint sensors, it is inter-
esting to note that, while early devices with such sensors (such
as the Motorola Atrix) featured their sensor on the rear of the
device, where it could be avoided or covered by a case, more
recent implementations (such as the iPhone and Samsung’s
Galaxy range of devices) feature the fingerprint reader on the
front, within the device’s physical home button. This presents
usability benefits for consumers, since authentication can be
carried out using a button they already use for other tasks.
Additionally, for the purpose of unlocking the device, the
same button which was used to wake the phone can then be
immediately used as a fingerprint reader to verify the user’s
fingerprint. On the other hand, this also makes it easier for a
user to unintentionally authenticate a request, simply through
over-familiarity with the process.
Continuing this trend, it is conceivable that in the future,
the need for a fingerprint reader in itself may be eliminated,
given a recent patent application by Apple [21], to include a
fingerprint reader within the screen. At that point, and arguably
also today, with the reader a component of one of the major
buttons on the phone, the question arises over if a user has
a choice as to whether they wish to be fingerprinted or not
while using a device. While users can avoid using the reader
for the purpose of authentication, it is much more difficult
with the current “black-box” style fingerprint authentication
systems to verify that the fingerprint data isn’t being read or
stored. With sensors embedded in screens, it may not be clear
to a user when they are authenticating a request, since the
authentication process may no longer be a clear distinct action,
thus bypassing the careful consideration that should be taken
before proceeding.
B. Fingerprint Payments
The latest, and potentially one of the most visible, con-
sumer application of fingerprint-based authentication on smart-
phones is for the authentication of payments carried out
via a mobile device. By placing their smartphone against a
contactless reader, a user is able to select the card to use for
payment, and authenticate the payment by simply placing their
finger against their smartphone’s fingerprint reader.
Early implementations which we see on today’s consumer
devices, such as Apple Pay, appear to have a number of
weaknesses, as exhibited in their own demonstration. Specif-
ically, there is no authentication of the transaction amount
visible — as seen in their product demonstration, an Apple
Pay user simply knows that they are being asked to approve
a transaction with the selected card, but there is no indication
of the value of the transaction being carried out [22].
Taking into consideration the design of smartphone-based
payment systems, which are now deployed and operational in
the USA and UK, we believe there is a risk of early users being
victims of fraud, as a result of innovative fraudsters, given the
reliance of these systems on fingerprint authentication. Even
putting aside the limitations of fingerprints being unchanged
and potentially known to third parties, and the ease with which
they can be captured, a fingerprint reader is ultimately used to
authenticate to a “trusted” area of the smartphone, often based
on ARM TrustZone technology, as discussed earlier.
If the contents of this TrustZone were to be compromised,
the user’s fingerprint would most likely no longer be necessary
in order to authorise transactions on behalf of a user. The
presentation of a permitted fingerprint is used by the semi-
isolated Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to permit the
use of cryptographic keys, which are themselves only accessi-
ble by the TEE. In the event of the TEE being compromised
(as discussed earlier), these keys may be exfiltrated from the
device, or otherwise abused by a malicious user (such as by
forcibly enrolling a new fingerprint).
VIII. POTENTIAL MITIGATIONS
Despite many of the potential risks and challenges of the
use of fingerprints in secure authentication, it is clear that
consumers feel it is secure enough, and products incorporating
fingerprint readers are now reaching the market in significant
quantities. In this section, we consider some ways in which
these risks can potentially be mitigated or reduced, to allow
for a practical solution to the clear user demand for a simpler
means of authentication.
A. Legislation
We firstly believe that strong legislation is necessary to
govern how biometric information may be used, and shared.
Where such legislation exists, it often covers only government
or official use of biometric information [23], rather than
commercial or third party use of, and gathering of, biometric
information.
When a user voluntarily provides their fingerprints to a
piece of consumer electronic equipment, they are no longer
engaging with a legislated entity. Indeed, in many jurisdictions,
the handling of electronic or personal data (which may include
biometric data) is left to self-regulation and loose oversight,
rather than legislation [24].
Given the unique way in which biometric information
cannot be changed, we believe that legislation governing the
technological protection of biometric data is necessary, to
ensure that consumer technology utilising it is designed to
reduce the risk of compromise as much as possible.
B. Transparent Implementations
In order to mitigate many of the risks of current im-
plementations (such as TrustZone exploits and similar), we
believe it would be advisable for implementations of biomet-
ric authentication to be designed and documented publicly,
with all relevant source code as to the operation of the
authentication mechanism made available for review. With
fingerprint authentication set to become near-ubiquitous in the
short-term, there would be considerable benefit in ensuring
that the technology is secure, on account of the hesitations
people hold about the use of biometric authentication, and the
significance with which end users place on trust and resistance
to attack [25]. Ensuring that implementations are transparent
and open to independent scrutiny would facilitate verification
of correct implementation, and the identification of security
weaknesses. While it could be argued that such disclosure
would make attacks easier, a lack of source code has not held
researchers back in finding vulnerabilities in TrustZone and
other fingerprint reader implementations, as discussed earlier.
C. Trusted Software
If a product offers a consistent and predictable user inter-
face for the request of fingerprint authentication, it is important
to ensure that this interface is trustworthy. For example, it is
critical that the application or service requesting identifying
information is clearly and correctly identified to the user, to
prevent social engineering attacks, or falsely generated prompts
from overriding the system prompt to change the appearance
of the prompt (making it appear a different application is
requesting authentication).
We also recommend that at each opportunity, the user be
clearly presented (using a trusted software implementation,
which is again open to scrutiny and security testing by in-
dependent researchers) with a summary of the action being
carried out at each point. A separate cryptographic key should
be used for each application using biometric authentication,
to prevent a rogue application from generating a valid au-
thentication message in response to its own request, which
would be accepted by another service as an attestation that the
user had agreed to an operation. This would be a risk in a
scenario where a service accepted a signed random value as
an attestation — another application could request the same
random value, and replay the token, unless a unique key is
used for every application.
D. Avoiding Over-use
One factor we have identified is that the over-use of fin-
gerprint authentication may well pose a risk. Consumers seek
convenience, and the convenience of fingerprint authentication
is attractive, compared with the task of typing lengthy pass-
words on a small on-screen keyboard. Despite this, repetitive
authentications result in people becoming lazy, as is seen in
their use of short or simple passwords for which they are
asked for regularly. If fingerprint authentication is over-used,
we believe it likely that people may become overly comfortable
with simply approving everything that is requested, rather than
validating the precise request. Especially when a fingerprint
reader is located on the home key of a product, the natural
reaction will be to approve the action, rather than to scrutinise
it further and verify that it is indeed the action which should
be carried out. By encouraging users to pause and consider
the request, perhaps even enforcing this via a short on-screen
time-out, this would go some way to ensuring that users are
aware of the action they are providing authentication for.
E. Awareness of Risks
We believe that it is important for service and application
implementers to be aware of the risks of fingerprint authenti-
cation, particularly around those whose fingerprints may be
known to, or have been captured by, third parties. While
today’s payment solutions allow fingerprint authentication as
a means of proof the card-holder is present, this ultimately
relies on the integrity of the TrustZone implementation used
to hold these keys. If these keys were extracted, or a man-
made fingerprint was presented to the reader, the proof that
a customer was present to authorise a transaction is less
robust. With the ease with which an unwilling party can be
compelled to give their fingerprints, it is also likely that people
may be forced to unlock fingerprint-authenticated equipment
against their will, to authorise transactions or simply for their
fingerprints to be captured for future use.
F. Plan for Compromise
Finally, in light of the previous point, we believe it is
necessary to begin to plan for a future where fingerprint
and other biometric authentication is readily subverted by
malicious use of, or threat of, force. While the same is true
for today’s passwords and PINs, we are always capable of
selecting and using a new password. Early adopters of bio-
metric authentication technologies will be at risk of emerging
threats, and we should be prepared for a time where people’s
fingerprints are widely known. For this reason, we believe
it important to consider this risk in future, when deploying
biometric technology, and for companies relying on it to be
aware that the presence of a seemingly biometrically-verified
signature does not necessarily indicate the user has agreed or
given their consent. This may also have implications on the
legal status of biometrically-authenticated signatures.
IX. CONCLUSION
Biometric user authentication, in the form of fingerprint
authentication, is becoming increasingly mainstream, seen on
almost all present or upcoming flagship mobile handsets. De-
spite its wide reach, we have highlighted a number of concerns
around the fundamental security of the use of fingerprints for
authentication purposes. The permanent, irrevocable nature of
fingerprints means that their compromise or capture is a life-
long concern. We also leave fingerprints behind on almost
everything we touch, including specifically the screens of the
products we use in our day-to-day lives. Researchers have
shown the ease with which a fingerprint can be cloned from
photographs, or simply a glass which has been touched by
an individual. We also explored the risks of implementations
of today’s fingerprint authentication technology, specifically
surrounding some of the risks of TrustZone-based implemen-
tations of key storage and fingerprint verification, and exploits
which have previously allowed for arbitrary code execution,
compromising the supposedly-secure execution environment.
We have also explored the risk of improper implementation
of fingerprint readers in commercially available smartphones,
including those which expose fingerprint data to any app
running on the phone.
Fingerprint authentication looks set to continue to grow,
despite the warnings of the security industry. While the con-
venience it offers is clearly of interest to consumers, the
ability to replace passwords with something that is faster
and unforgettable is clear to users, albeit with the caveat it
can also never be changed. The next few years will likely
dictate how biometric authentication will work in the future
— could we end up in a position where muggers simply take
fingerprints of their victims, knowing they now hold that user’s
keys for life? We have made a series of recommendations
towards improving the technical implementation of biometric
security on current consumer devices, and enhancing trust
of their software, although these will not address some of
the fundamental concerns of the static nature of biometric
identifiers and their use in authentication.
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